households in social evolution any more than elephants could have preceded bacteria in biological evolution. But in denying the usefulness of the concepts of selection and adaptation, Weber bars from sociological theory any possible application to it of Darwin's fundamental insight that qualitative change comes about, and can only come about, through heritable variation and the selective advantage that the environment confers (or doesn't) on the carriers of the variants and thereby the variants' differential chances of replication and diffusion.
So that, it might seem, is that. And so it would be, if it were not for the part of Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft concerned with the sociology not of religion but of law, where Weber directly addresses the question: where does change come from in a traditional society where everything goes on being done as it has been done before? Woher stammt dies Neue? -or, as he puts it in the earlier chapter where he is discussing custom and convention, how do any innovations (Neuerungen) ever arise (1956: 399, 188) ? He dismisses out of hand the Historical School's idea of the evolution (and here, he uses the word Evolution) of a Volksgeist as the carrier of a 'supra-individual organic whole', thereby echoing the criticism of Roscher that he had published in Schmollers Jahrbuch in 1903. 1 Instead, he sets out two alternative processes by which novel forms of social behaviour emerge. The first is where an individual initiative is diffused through imitation (Nachahmung) and selection (Auslese) within the group concerned -the nearest approach to the process in its pure form being when it is what he specifically calls an Ausleseprozess between either ethnic or religious groups. The second is where one form of social action is selected (Auslese again) as better adapted (angepasst) to the interests of those involved through a collective response to changed environmental conditions. Weber's language here, as in the discussion of custom and convention where he says that emergent 'understandings' (Einverständnisse) will only survive if angepasst to the external Lebensbedingungen ('conditions of life'), cannot be construed as merely metaphorical. Still less can it be construed as ideologically biased. Weber is seeking to analyse what actually happens when a human community evolves out of one existing and apparently stable sociological kind into another. He does not see the process in terms of natural selection: there is no hint here or anywhere else in his writings of an embryonic sociobiology. Variation is transmitted either through imitation of a novel example or through conformity to a novel rule governing the interactions between the incumbents of complementary roles. But the success of any innovation among the population within which it has emerged is determined by the competitive advantage conferred on its carriers by the environment.
This, on any reading, is remarkably close to the way in which social and cultural evolution are currently conceptualized within the neo-Darwinian paradigm, which, for an increasing number of behavioural scientists, is displacing the so-called 'SSSM' (Standard Social Science Model) that was dominant for most of the 20th century (Tooby and Cosmides, 1992) . In the neo-Darwinian paradigm, cultural and social selection are seen as analogous but not reducible to natural selection (Runciman, 1998) . In natural selection, the units of selection are the mutant genes that transmit instructions for building protein molecules from one organism to another, and the chances of diffusion and replication of the mutations depend on how the environment acts on the phenotypic effects of the individual carriers' genes -their physiological attributes (wings and claws), their behaviour (threats and displays) and their artefacts (burrows and nests). In cultural selection, the units of selection are the mutant beliefs, tastes, values, and so on, in which are encoded the instructions for behaviour, which are transmitted from one organism's mind to another's by imitation and learning, and the mutants' chances of diffusion and replication depend on how the environment acts on the phenotypic effects of the individual carriers ' 'memes' (fashion, technology, art, etc.) . In social selection, the units of selection are the mutant practices in which are encoded the instructions defining economic, ideological and political roles, and the mutants' chances of diffusion and replication depend on how the environment acts on the phenotypic effects of the individual carriers' practices -markets, churches, armies, law-courts, schools and social institutions generally.
It goes without saying that Weber could not have been expected to anticipate the writings of present-day evolutionary psychologists, anthropologists or sociologists any more than Darwin could have been expected to anticipate the developments in population genetics and molecular biology that have vindicated beyond dispute his original insight about what he called 'descent with modification'. It would be an obvious anachronism to impute to Weber a late 20th-century version of the relation between units of selection with the formal properties of replicators, their carriers and their extended phenotypic effects. But that makes it all the more remarkable that any part of what one of his commentators calls his 'rudimentary theory of stages' (Treiber, 1985: 843) should be able to be rephrased without significant loss of meaning in the idiom of neo-Darwinian theory as expounded and debated two generations after his death.
Particularly noticeable, from this point of view, is Weber's use of the term Träger, which recurs time and again in his writings, particularly in the part of Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft concerned with the sociology of religion. Sometimes, Träger is used without any selectionist implications, as for example when he talks about the concept of the 'association' (Verband) as a local Kultträger (1956: 254) : this means merely that in mutually exclusive political communities like the Greek poleis, their own local gods were worshipped without any priesthood transcending the different Verbände. Similarly, when he says in 'The Protestant Ethic' that the Puritan Lebensauffassung was the Träger (mistranslated in the standard English version as 'influence') of economically rational Lebensführung (1922: 195) , he means no more than that the two went consistently together. On the other hand, when he says that Hausherrschaft is the original Träger of all Verwaltung (1956: 389) , he evidently does mean that the mutant practices defining what we call 'administration' were initially 'carried', in the precise technical sense, by the roles of the members of patriarchal households. (It is accordingly a pity that the standard English translation should here read 'The primeval form of "administration" is represented by patriarchal power, i.e. the rule of the household', thus missing the point entirely.) Furthermore, Weber often uses Träger in a way that implicitly distinguishes not only between cultural and social but also between individual and group selection. In the classic case of the exemplary prophet, the original cultural mutation involves novel precepts that attract individual disciples who adopt the prophet's ethical doctrines and ritual conduct through imitation and learning. At this stage, diffusion and replication of the new ideas, beliefs and values -which, as always, are competing with others in the recipient minds -depend on the satisfaction that they afford to, in a phrase of Weber's own, the metaphysical needs of the spirit (Geist) driven to brood on ethical and religious questions (1956: 117) , with the likelihood that the original message will be reinterpreted in the next generation and adapted (angepasst) to changing religious needs (1922: 240) . Or, in other words, cultural evolution comes about through a process of exosomatically inherited variation and competitive selection of mutant memes.
Thereafter, however, the next typical stage in the Entwicklungsprozess ('ongoing course of evolution') is that the disciples become priests or pastors serving a congregation of laity. There now emerge sets of mutant practices that define these roles, and these practices are likewise selected in response to the features of their environment that favour their replication (or not). But here we are dealing not only with social, rather than cultural, selection but also with the competing interests of the different groups, rather than individuals, whose constituent roles are the carriers of the mutant practices. Between these, the competition is not for psychological influence but for institutional power, whether ideological, economic or political. The 'power position' (Machtstellung) of the priesthood, in particular (1956: 278) , depends on features of the environment within which the priestly role is performed, ranging from the interests of the parishioners to the competition of prophets or magicians to the political pressures, both intra-and inter-societal, to which the practices defining the priestly role, including the performance of public rituals and the exposition of sacred texts, may be subjected.
Finally, notice that Weber expressly avoids the fallacy of assuming that to identify the contingent cause of a mutation is to explain its evolutionary consequences. He is quite explicit that the motives and ambitions of religious reformers may have nothing at all to do with whether, in the language of evolutionary theory, their doctrines are fit and hence selected for their function in adapting the behaviour of their followers to an environment in which one kind of Lebensführung and Berufsauffassung will be favoured as against another. The Kulturwirkungen of the Reformation, he says in 'The Protestant Ethic', were largely, and perhaps (so far as his own agenda is concerned) predominantly, unforeseen and undesired consequences of the reformers ' Arbeit (1922: 82; cf. Mackinnon, 1987: 241) , and again in the essay on Confucianism and Taoism, he insists that nothing was further from the minds of the Puritans themselves than that their other-worldly ethic should lead to the working-out of a this-worldly economic rationalism (1922: 534) . It is not just that purposive social actions have unintended consequences, but that cultural mutations, although the deliberate creations of ideological innovators, might as well be random so far as concerns a satisfactory explanation of the subsequent Entwicklungsprozess.
The 'Weber Thesis' Revisited
Suppose, therefore, that Weber had formulated the central argument of 'The Protestant Ethic' 2 in the selectionist language of the passages that I have cited from his sociology of law. If he had, not only would it have been much easier to see precisely what he understood to be the causal relation between Protestantism and (as he defined it) 'modern' capitalism; it would also have been much easier to see where, and why, his argument is in need of reformulation and what evidence would be needed to validate it. It is ironic, given Weber's objection to selectionist language as metaphorical, that the text of 'The Protestant Ethic' is liberally sprinkled with metaphors like 'elective affinity', 'paving the way', 'lever', 'roots', 'standing by the cradle' and 'slamming the monastery door' -not to mention the famous 'steel-hard casing' (regularly mistranslated, following Parsons, as 'iron cage' 3 ), which has replaced Baxter's 'light cloak ' (1922: 203) , or the 'switchmen' of the 'Introduction' to the essays on the world religions -the 'world pictures' that have 'determined the tracks down which action has been propelled by the dynamics of interest ' (1922: 252) . Could Weber not have addressed directly the question whether, and if so how, mutation of religious memes created an environment in which practices constitutive of 'modern' capitalism were then replicated and diffused by carriers who were predominantly, and perhaps overwhelmingly, Northwest European, middle-class, Protestant entrepreneurs?
His starting-point would have had to be the distribution of, on the one hand, a specific set of religious memes and, on the other, a specific set of economic practices in 16th-century Northwest Europe, when markets, technology and law had evolved only as far as what he regarded, despite the sophistication of Renaissance Italian banking, trading and manufacturing (Cohen, 1980 (Cohen, , 1983 , as their 'pre-modern' form. The subsequent processes of cultural and social selection cannot be analysed separately from each other: the aspiring capitalist entrepreneurs had to learn how to run a business from teachers, parents or role-models, just as the exemplary Protestant divines had to respond to the pressures imposed on their role by their economic, ideological and political environment. Moreover, the distribution of the memes and practices at the starting-point was itself the outcome of other, antecedent evolutionary sequences: 'Protestant' memes were the homologous descendants of Lollard and Hussite and perhaps Waldensian memes, just as the practices of 'modern' capitalism were the homologous descendants of the practices of putting-out, part-time wage-labour and credit financing by middlemen. But whatever the period chosen over which a contrast is to be drawn, it is in principle possible to identify the mutant religious memes and the mutant economic practices that Weber had in mind, to trace their diffusion and replication among adjacent and successive populations, and then to establish how far the replication and diffusion of each within Protestant communities significantly enhanced the probability of replication of the other through the kind of feedback familiar in evolutionary theory from many self-organizing, pathdependent complex systems.
Culturally, the two critical mutations whose replication and diffusion need to be traced are, first, the 'predestinarian' and, second, the 'secular inquiry' meme. Under the 'predestinarian' meme come the instructions for the conduct of life that Weber claimed to follow, albeit indirectly, from the fusion of the Calvinist doctrine of salvation with the Lutheran concept of vocation and the resulting idea that this-worldly asceticism is the outward manifestation of God's grace. The behaviour enjoined on the elect comes to involve both hard work and fair dealing, and the desire to be, and know oneself to be, one of the elect comes to be expressed both in these and in the diligent accumulation of wealth, which must not, however, be applied to self-indulgent personal consumption or extravagant public display. The profits of capitalist entrepreneurship must be saved, which means reinvesting them in the enterprise. These bundles of instructions affecting phenotype, although not obviously or directly psychologically gratifying, generate a strong collective sense of self-esteem and a vigorous disapproval of conduct that violates the communal norms. Indeed, Weber goes so far as to say in the essay on the 'Protestant Sects' that this type of discipline is much stricter than that of any church (1922: 228) . But it was a material as well as a spiritual discipline, yielding significant pecuniary as well as eschatological rewards. As Keith Thomas has commented, Protestant clergymen did not guarantee worldly success to those who obeyed God's word; but they could not help implying that 'godliness was somehow linked with prosperity ' (1971: 88-9) .
Under the 'secular inquiry' meme come the instructions for the conduct of life (and therefore business), which are bound up with the Protestant repudiation of the supernatural in favour of self-help, empirical research, practical innovation and (not least) individual study and interpretation of the Bible. Weber does appear, as Goody (1996) has argued, to have overestimated both the originality and the importance of double-entry bookkeeping, which he seems sometimes to regard as almost a touchstone of rationality. But in Protestant communities there was, by comparison with Catholic communities, wider diffusion and more consistent replication of memes enjoining literacy (for women as well as men), rejection of ecclesiastical authority, exploration of the natural world and trial-and-error learning. Science, in the Protestant Weltanschauung, was favoured not only over Popish superstition and idolatry but over the kind of other-worldly, mystical contemplation of the Beyond attributed by Weber not only to Buddhism and Hinduism but to the Lutheran version of salvation through a unio mystica with God. It is not that scientific progress is to be identified exclusively with Protestantism. Weber knew perfectly well that there had been influential scientists (including Copernicus) who were Catholics and that there had been influential Protestants (including Luther) who repudiated their findings. But 'ascetic' Protestantism was particularly well able to reconcile empirical scientific research with religious interests (1922: 564), and it was the abandonment of magic that made possible the 'upsurge of technology' (Thomas, 1971: 65, quoting Weber on magic as the principal obstruction in the way of 'rationalization of economic life').
This pattern of cultural evolution, however, could have had nothing whatever to do with the rise of 'modern' capitalism if there had not been in existence a set of economic practices out of which the ongoing, privately owned, rationally organized 'modern' capitalist enterprise could evolve. Weber made this point to good effect against his critics during his lifetime (Davis, 1978; cf. Oakes, 1988) , and the various necessary conditions for the evolution of capitalism as he came to define it are set out more fully in the lectures posthumously published as the General Economic History: formally free labour, heritable private ownership of the physical means of production, contract law, urban social structure, mechanized technology, rational capital accounting, and not least a market for the products of the ongoing capitalist enterprise such that sufficient profit can be made for reinvestment to be profitable in its turn. But although necessary, they were not sufficient, even with the added benefits of a rising population and an inflow of bullion. There had also to be available in 17th-century Northwest Europe potential entrepreneurs imbued with the distinctively Protestant 'spirit of capitalism', without which they would not have made the transition from 'traditional' moneymaking roles to the dedicated, calculating, self-denying accumulation of private corporate wealth.
The evidence on which Weber himself based his case is, as a long succession of critics has pointed out, arbitrarily chosen, imperfectly documented and tendentiously deployed. But that does not by itself prove his conclusion to be false. It is a commonplace of neo-Darwinian evolutionary theory that small-scale, locally based and initially unpromising mutations can have surprisingly farreaching as well as unintended consequences, even (under some conditions) to the point of so-called 'runaway effects'. The members of certain critical groups of 17th-century Northwest Europeans could have been the carriers both of 'thisworldly ascetic' predestinarian and secular inquiry memes and of the mutant practices constitutive of the 'modern' capitalist Betrieb ('enterprise'). Moreover, the probability of replication of those practices might have been significantly higher where these memes were closest to fixation in the relevant populations; and thereafter, the institutional as well as demographic and ecological environment of other European states might have been sufficiently favourable to the replication of the practices constitutive of the ongoing, privately owned Betrieb for the earlier correlation to cease to hold and this-worldly asceticism to become merely a vestigial 'caput mortuum ' (1956: 348) .
For the diffusion and replication through imitation and learning of instructions affecting phenotype, appropriate models are to hand in Boyd and Richerson's Culture and the Evolutionary Process (1985: Ch.3) . 'This-worldly asceticism' might have spread through a process of what they call 'conformist transmission', in which the behaviour imitated is that which is most frequently observed, and it might have been supplemented by a process of what they call 'indirect bias', in which imitation is of a so-called 'indicator trait' seen as conferring prestige. The rate of vertical transmission from parents to children may have depended in part on whether both parents were carriers of the mutant memes, and it would be useful to have some reliable data about, for example, the proportion of Protestant mothers who did indeed read the Scriptures themselves and pass on to their sons instructions about Lebensführung that made them more likely to dedicate themselves to the acquisition of technical knowledge and the accumulation and reinvestment of wealth. But horizontal transmission of memes across peer-groups and age-sets can be extremely rapid in a favourable environment, and might have been in this case. Notice too that neither conformist transmission nor indirect bias presupposes convinced and consistent belief in Calvinist doctrine. Conversion isn't necessary -mere 'adhesion' (Nock, 1933: 7) will do. It is sometimes argued against Weber that he assumes much too readily that the members of the Protestant bourgeoisie genuinely subscribed to the tenets of Calvin's theology. But their behaviour could have been directed by Protestant memes, and been in turn influential in promoting the practices constitutive of 'modern' capitalism, even if only a small number of convinced predestinarians were actually driven by the 'unprecedented inner loneliness' that Weber attributes to the solitary individual faced directly with the immutable decrees of an absolutely transcendental Calvinist God (1922: 93) , or by 'mastery of fear through control of the known world and oneself' (Eisen, 1979: 206) , as expounded by Puritan writers like William Perkins.
Thereafter, on Weber's hypothesis, selective pressure ensured the competitive success of ongoing, 'rationally' organized, capitalist enterprises owned and managed by this-worldly ascetics, and the roles of these new entrepreneurs displaced the 'traditional' roles of merchants, traders, speculators and ad hoc investors in commenda, bottomry loans or limited partnerships (Kommanditgesellschaften) . Competition between firms that are differently staffed and organized is of course a standard topic in economic theory, and there is a substantial literature in which it is analysed by analogy with natural selection. Indeed, one leading economist has pointed out that the ploughing back of profits 'is the mechanism of selection which is closest to Darwinism, with saving -reproduction of capital -taking the place of reproduction of offspring and operating symmetrically on gainers and losers' (Matthews, 1984: 102) . If, therefore, cultural group selection was at the same time favouring those communities of this-worldly ascetics in which hard work and fair dealing (including fair dealing in relations with out-group members) had become the uninvadable, evolutionarily stable strategy, then the capital-reproducing enterprises whose constitutive practices were favoured by social selection would enjoy a further advantage in competition with the enterprises of the 'adventurers' and 'projectors' to whom Weber attributes both short-term commercial horizons and untrustworthy commercial ethics.
Plausible as this interpretation of the 'Weber thesis' may seem, however, Weber does not produce the evidence to validate it. It may be that the underlying logic of his argument is stronger than his critics have generally been willing to allow (Hernes, 1989) . But neither he nor anyone else has demonstrated that Protestant entrepreneurs in general, or even Calvinist émigrés escaping the Counter-Reformation in particular, were actually driven by either a 'predestinarian' meme or some psychological compulsion deriving indirectly from it to continuous reinvestment in their enterprises on a scale that they would otherwise have failed to consider. Nor were memes enjoining hard work and fair dealing unique to Puritan texts. Nor can as much weight be given as Weber did to broad ecological correlations between frequency of 'modern' capitalist practices and of presumptively 'predestinarian' memes among the Protestant populations of Holland or England or Switzerland or Western Germany. Nor does Weber demonstrate that earlier capitalists were significantly less 'rationally' entrepreneurial in their commercial practices, whatever their religious convictions may have been, than their later Protestant counterparts. Nor can his selective quotations from Benjamin Franklin or Richard Baxter or various Protestant divines be used as evidence that successful Protestant entrepreneurs in fact came from families where the Calvinist doctrine of salvation and Lutheran idea of vocation as he interprets them had been transmitted to them. The connection that Weber draws between the sense of belonging to the 'elect' and the motivation, whether conscious or not, to accumulate wealth through hard work and fair dealing is entirely consistent with his own methodological precepts whereby sociology is permitted to construct its concepts 'through classification of possible "subjective meaning" ' and 'as if action in fact proceeded consciously oriented to its meaning ' (1956: 11) . But nowhere does he supplement this with the necessary empirical evidence for the feedback between the replication and diffusion of distinctively Protestant memes, on the one hand, and of the practices constitutive of the 'modern' capitalist Betrieb, on the other.
It might still be argued that a recognizable version of Weber's original argument can be sustained by giving priority to the 'secular inquiry' over the 'predestinarian' meme. If the Protestant repudiation of magic and the supernatural made possible a more rational attitude to, and a more vigorous application of, new techniques, might this have been what encouraged Northwest European Protestant artisans, farmers, tradesmen and small manufacturers to adopt the practices constitutive of 'modern' capitalism? Again, however, the difficulty is that Weber fails to provide the necessary evidence linking the two. His Protestant businessmen are distinguished from the 'irrational' adventurers and projectors not so much by their technical inventiveness and willingness to discard procedures sanctified by tradition as by their 'specifically bourgeois ethics of vocation' and 'superior bourgeois business morality ' (1922: 198, 202 ). In the Foreword of 1920, he continues to assert that despite the 'fundamental importance of the economic factor', the capacity for 'practical-rational' Lebensführung presupposes removal of the obstacle to it presented by magic and religion (1922: 12) . But no evidence is provided that would invalidate the hypothesis that the changing economic and political environment of Northwest Europe itself generated the selective pressure that favoured mutant business practices, including the adoption of new accounting techniques and employment of formally free wage labourers, of which Northwest European artisans, farmers, tradesmen and small manufacturers would have been the carriers not because of their anti-Catholic religious affiliation but because of their class position and political environment. Weber's prototypical young man from one of the 'putting-out families' who goes out and recruits carefully chosen, closely supervised wage-workers, markets the finished product directly to solicited customers, and lowers his prices by increasing his turnover (1922: 52) thereby drives his 'traditional' competitors out of business. But why should religion have anything to do with it? This is indeed the way in which evolutionary change comes about: whoever the first Träger of the mutant practices may happen to be, if those practices give significant competitive advantage to the enterprises into which they are introduced, their continuing replication and diffusion are effectively assured, despite the initial hostility which Weber assumes that his prototype will have met. 'Rationalisierung' of this kind did not have to be driven by a specifically Protestant 'spirit of capitalism' any more than did the innovations that brought into being the capitalism of Renaissance Italy, whose constitutive practices were equally well adapted to their carriers' class position and political environment, despite the hostility that they likewise met.
The relative significance of the different economic and political influences that caused the economies of Northwest Europe to outperform those of Southern and Eastern Europe is much debated among historians. But for the purpose of assessing the 'Weber thesis', their relative significance is immaterial. The point is rather that there are quite enough such influences unconnected with religious beliefs or attitudes to account for what then looks increasingly like a spurious correlation with Protestantism. In the 17th century, England and Holland enjoyed a number of advantages that were denied to France, Spain and Italy, including a lower tax burden, freer trade, easier access to credit, fewer impediments to internal commerce, a more favourable legal system for the resolution of commercial disputes, a higher proportion of the population in productive employment, and a more efficient agriculture. Admittedly, some of these relative advantages may have been linked to events consequential on the Reformation: for example, the supersession of Antwerp by Amsterdam as a commercial centre was clearly bound up with the course of the ultimately successful resistance of the Dutch to Spanish rule. But that is of no help to Weber's argument. Weber needed to demonstrate not that the Reformation helped to create, in what turned out to be the Protestant parts of Europe, a political and economic environment more favourable to the replication and diffusion of 'modern' capitalist practices than the political and economic environment of Catholic Europe, but that the replication and diffusion of those practices came about because, and only because, their carriers were also the carriers of 'predestinarian' and 'secular inquiry' memes but for which they would have continued to conduct their businesses in the traditional 'pre-modern' way.
Is There an Alternative Version?
That, however, is not yet the end of the matter. As Richard Swedberg has pointed out in his comprehensive study of Weber's economic sociology (1998: 129) , it is clear from the General Economic History that Weber saw the evolution of the 'modern' capitalist system as a historical process extending not only long before but also long after the Reformation. It is noticeable too, as Randall Collins has pointed out (1980: 934) , that there is no explicit mention of predestinarianism in Weber's General Economic History: the emphasis is more on ecclesiastical discipline than on Calvinist doctrine as such. Nobody will dispute that Protestant memes continued to be replicated, with some significant further mutations, long after their original formulation by Luther and Calvin, much as Weber describes Methodist striving for the 'higher life' as a kind of 'surrogate ' predestinarianism (1922: 149) . As he remarked in the passage that I have already cited from the 'Introduction' to his essays on the world religions, religious doctrines are always likely to be 'adapted' to fit changing needs. There is thus no difficulty for a selectionist version of the 'Weber thesis' in Protestantism's 'contradictions between deterministic and voluntaristic elements whose variable presentation provides a critical measure of flexibility for ideologues engaged in the difficult business of getting ordinary persons to undertake initiatives to change a hostile, recalcitrant world' (Zaret, 1987: 271-2) . Might not the instructions affecting phenotype that were dominant in Protestant communities many generations after the Reformation have furnished an environment more favourable to the replication and diffusion of 'modern' capitalist practices at that time than those still dominant in Catholic communities?
There is, perhaps, a hint of this in Weber's own remark that what the 'religious' 17th century bequeathed to the 'utilitarian' 18th was above all an immensely, not to say pharisaically, good conscience in relation to Gelderwerb ('making of money'), provided that the money was acquired by legal means (1922: 198) . But it is David Landes, in The Wealth and Poverty of Nations, who explicitly interprets Weber's argument as a claim that in Northern Europe in the 16th to 18th centuries, 'religion encouraged the appearance in numbers of a personality type that had been exceptional and adventitious before, and that this type created a new economy (a new mode of production) that we know as (industrial) capitalism ' (1998: 178) . 'Personality type', like 'national character', can be no less elusive a historical and psychological quarry than Weber's 'capitalist spirit' itself. But if bundles of instructions for the conduct of life involving not only hard work and fair dealing but also technical innovation and the reinvestment of profit were transmitted down successive generations of Protestant but not Catholic families, then the greater economic success of Protestant relative to Catholic countries in the later 17th and 18th centuries could be due, among other things, to middle-class Protestant sons being more likely to be the Träger of mutant capitalist practices favourable to the productive enterprises of which they were the owners and managers. Moreover, if their commitment to labour and industry was shared by their Protestant workmen, as Weber, quoting from Sir William Petty on 17th-century Holland, takes it to have been (1922: 201), then those enterprises will have benefited twice over from the adoption of the practice of employing formally free wage-workers.
An argument to this effect is not to be confused with an argument to the effect that Protestant sons were more likely to be upwardly mobile from their systact of origin than their Catholic counterparts. They may have been. But that is 'social selection' in the almost trivial sense that Weber gives it in the opening chapter of Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft -peaceful competition between individuals for relative Lebens-oder Ü berlebenschancen (1956: 20) -rather than the selectionist sense of relative fitness for further replication and diffusion of mutant practices. No qualitative change in the economy follows from a higher rate of mobility into privileged roles by members of one rather than another religious denomination unless the privileged roles are altered by mutant practices of which the upwardly mobile members of one but not another denomination are the Träger, and the memes of which they are also the Träger have caused them to carry the mutant practices.
That, however, is precisely the implication of the Landes version of the 'Weber thesis'. If by 'modern' capitalism is meant industrial capitalism, then on any plausible dating the critical stage in the evolution of the European economy comes long after the doctrinal changes in traditional Christian theology bound up with the Reformation. But the Reformation did unquestionably result in the transmission down successive generations of Protestant families of a set of beliefs, values and attitudes different in several ways from those handed down in Catholic families. Whatever the implications of the maxims preached in the original Puritan texts on which Weber bases his argument, the 'religious atmosphere', in his own words, of the Heimat and Elternhaus (1922: 22) was one in which sons of Protestant parents acquired by imitation and learning instructions that cannot fail to have influenced their adult Lebensführung whether or not they subscribed to the theology underlying them. Seen as a question not of 'elective affinity' between Protestant memes and 'modern' capitalist practices but of inherited Einverständ-nisse that will only survive if angepasst to the external Lebensbedingungen, the 'Weber thesis' becomes a plausible selectionist hypothesis about socialization that can in principle be tested against the evidence for what Protestant sons of business-owning families were actually taught in their homes and schools in the late 17th and 18th centuries when the transition from mercantile to industrial capitalism was under way.
Landes sets out his argument in very general terms, supplementing it with evidence for the hostility of the Counter-Reformation to education of the kind that was held to threaten the authority of the Catholic Church. But the appropriate test case is, as argued by Marshall (1980 Marshall ( , 1981 , Scotland. At first sight, Scotland appears directly to contradict the 'Weber thesis': If Weber's account were valid, Scotland should have been a country in rapid economic expansion, with an avant-garde entrepreneurial class composed of ascetic accumulators of capital. During the entire period in which Calvinist bibliocracy reigned unchallenged, this certainly was not the case. (Pellicani, 1988: 69) But as Smout pointed out in his History of the Scottish People 1560-1850, although between 1560 and 1690 'the Reformation cannot be shown in any way to have favoured the rise of economic individualism', nevertheless 'if we take the long view of Scottish history it does become difficult not to believe that Calvinism contributed certain things which could hardly help but favour the expansion of economic activity and the enrichment of cultural life ' (1969: 88, 89-90) . Smout suggests that it was the 'serious-minded strain' in the Scottish character, coupled with an educational system that was by now less bound up with religious orthodoxy and available at primary, secondary and university level to pupils from a much wider range of systactic origins than hitherto, that enabled sober, pious, frugal, hard-working Scotsmen to take advantage, as they demonstrably did, of the economic opportunities that became available from the mid-18th century onwards. This, in effect, is what Marshall seeks to document on the basis of the evidence not only for the opinions and attitudes of Calvinist divines like James Durham and political economists like James Armour but for the practices of known Scottish entrepreneurs. Marshall's conclusion is that an 'ethos' (i.e. a set of instructions affecting phenotype) of the kind that Weber described was indeed handed down in 17th-and early 18th-century Scottish Protestant families, but that the 'conditions of action' (i.e. the environment) were at that time still unfavourable to the practices of 'modern' capitalism. If that is correct, then the 'Weber thesis' can be said to be vindicated -not in the terms in which he argued it himself in 'The Protestant Ethic', but in the selectionist terms in which he could have formulated it if he had brought to bear on it the concepts of imitation (Nachahmung), selection (Auslese) and adaptation (Angepasstheit) that he seems to have been willing to bring to bear, if only in passing, in his sociology of law. Moreover, such an approach would have been equally appropriate to his larger agenda and his attempt to account for the failure of China, in particular, to evolve into the 'new mode of production' that we know as 'industrial capitalism', since, as Marshall comments (1981: 272) , the Scottish situation is the inverse of the Chinese. In China, where many of the 'structural' preconditions favourable to 'modern' capitalist practices were present, the necessary cultural instructions affecting phenotype do appear to have been lacking among the members of the capitalist class.
Confirmation? The Case of China
Despite the hope that Weber expressed that sinologists would not find too much fault with his analysis of China, the essay on 'Confucianism and Taoism' has been hardly less strenuously attacked than the essay on the 'Protestant Ethic', and a broad consensus seems to have been reached among his critics to the effect that he systematically discounted the achievements, both economic and intellectual, of Chinese civilization. It is immaterial how far he lacked the necessary source materials or how far he can be charged with a Eurocentric reading of those that were available to him. Either way, there appears to be no doubt that Weber underestimated both the advances made by Chinese science and technology (including mass production of manufactures) and the flexibility and subversive potential of Confucian doctrine, while he overestimated both the lack of an entrepreneurial ethos and the restraints imposed on it by the strength of kinship ties. But the implication of these criticisms is to strengthen, not weaken, the selectionist version of the 'Weber thesis', since if China's potential for 'take-off' was that much greater than he was aware, its failure to achieve it suggests all the more strongly that there were selective pressures working against the replication and diffusion of the inherited memes that made 18th-century European Protestant entrepreneurs the Träger of 'modern' capitalistic practices. Indeed, Weber is explicit that the Chinese people were innately well suited to the adoption of these practices -perhaps more so, he suggests, than the Japanese (1922: 535). Long before Mark Elvin (1973: Ch.12 ) put forward the hypothesis of a 'high-level equilibrium trap', Weber had commented on the 'peculiar facts' that despite unmistakable expansion in the use of money and an enormous growth in population, the Chinese remained stuck with a stationary economy (1922: 290) . So it would seem to be all the more plausible to conclude that what was missing was, if not the 'predestinarian' or 'secular inquiry' memes that Weber claimed to find among his Northwest European entrepreneurs, at any rate instructions affecting phenotype of a kind analogous to those that were being handed down within Scottish and other Northwest European Protestant families in the generations preceding the so-called 'Industrial Revolution'.
Weber's claim is explicitly not that if Protestantism as such had somehow taken hold among hitherto Confucian groups where owners of private businesses were to be found, they would have been imbued with a Geist that would have caused them to take the Chinese economy forward 'zu einer modernkapitalistischen Entwicklung ' (1922: 341) . But he does, in effect, claim that the memes for the conduct of life constitutive of the Confucian ethic inhibited them from doing so. He acknowledges that the economic and political environment was inimical to the diffusion and replication of the practices constitutive of 'modern' capitalism. Indeed, political pressures were, in his view, particularly important: of the reasons, he says, for which a genuinely bürgerlicher, gewerblicher Kapitalismus failed to evolve in China, almost all 'lead back to the structure of the state ' (1922: 391) . But it is a Confucian state, whose ideology, of which the office-holding mandarins are the Träger (which is mistranslated in the standard English version as 'pillar'), actively discouraged a Lebensführung and Berufsauffassung of the Protestant kind (1922: 313) . So there should, if Weber is right, be evidence to be found that would establish, first, that the bundles of instructions affecting phenotype transmitted by imitation and learning within the families of the business-owning class were, through their Confucian content, such as to cause the members of those families to neglect or actively avoid the practices constitutive of 'modern' capitalism; and second, that the hostility to private entrepreneurs of the Chinese ruling class was likewise due to the continuing replication within the ruling class of intellectually conservative Confucian memes.
There is still the possibility that if the economic and political environment were in any case such that capitalist practices, even where 'modern' mutations had somehow appeared, had no chance whatever of replication and diffusion, then cultural selection has no explanatory part to play and Confucianism can be treated as no more than the self-serving ideology of the Chinese ruling class. Weber himself argues that after the successful centralization of the imperial Chinese state, there was no longer the pressure of competition between autonomous regions potentially at war with one another that would have favoured the practices of 'rational' organization of finance and industry on the model of the embattled nation-states of Western Europe (1922: 394) . Nor would such practices confer a competitive advantage on their carriers when the carriers were 'literati' whose 'prebendary' roles depended on their ability to fund their passage through the examination system and who would invest the wealth that they thereby acquired in land so that their heirs could fund other family members to pursue the same career in their turn (1922: 374) . But the fact remains that there were in China substantial business enterprises in mining, metallurgy, ceramics, silk, textiles, timber, sugar and tea. What, therefore, held them back? Is it not plausible to suppose that ideological as well as economic and political constraints must have had something to do with it?
There is certainly some evidence to show that what was missing in Chinese culture was an analogous variant of the 'secular inquiry' meme; thus, Elvin concedes that 'it would be quite reasonable to focus on cultural variables, especially those relating to science ' (1984: 384) . 'Secular' may seem an inappropriate term, since Confucianism, although generally counted, as by Weber, among the 'world religions', lacks, like Buddhism, any conception of God. Moreover, Confucianism, in Weber's view, is no less 'rational' than Protestantism, albeit in a different way (1922: 534; cf. 266) . But the Chinese, for all their achievements in science and technology, failed to apply, to build on, or even in some instances to remember these achievements in the way that was done in Western Europe and North America. Likewise, they often ignored or actively rejected Western innovations, or, if they did evince some curiosity about them, as in the case of timepieces and firearms, failed to exploit their potential usefulness. It may be that Weber took all this for granted. For example, he attributes the limited scale of the textile industry to its domestic organization, with both the making and marketing of the cloth in the hands of women (1922: 380), without apparently being aware of the widespread use as early as the 14th century of large spinning machines that were several times cheaper than the labour of the women whom they replaced. But if he had known about these large machines, he would once again have been entitled to argue that they strengthen, not weaken, his thesis. Why did the Chinese fail -by a 'hair's breadth', according to one historian (Jones, 1981: 160) -to make the relatively simple improvements to their spinning machinery that would have enabled them to achieve an autonomous industrial revolution based on textiles? Must the impediment not, after all, have been an environment unfavourable to the replication and diffusion of memes that would have encouraged their carriers to adopt the right mutant economic practices?
To vindicate this hypothesis, it is obviously not enough merely to cite the texts in which a hostility to scientific and technological innovation is either reported or actively expressed. Weber could, no doubt, have deployed abundant documentary evidence for the set of attitudes that he describes -the intellectual conservatism, the exaggerated respect for tradition, the ideal of the 'gentlemanly' way of life, the fear of 'sectarian' dissent, the attachment to bureaucratic routines, the disdain for riches acquired from money-making rather than office-holding, and what he called the geomancers' 'magical stereotyping' of technology and economics, which, in his view, totally inhibited the appearance of commercial and industrial enterprises of the 'modern' kind (1922: 483) . But what he needed also to do -and, if he had followed up his selectionist insights, would have seen that he needed to do -was to produce evidence for the continuing replication within the families of successive generations of Chinese entrepreneurs of explicitly antiinnovative Confucian memes. Bundles of instructions affecting phenotype transmitted by imitation and learning can and do include prohibitions, and it could well be that Chinese business families actively discouraged their sons from breaching Confucian tradition in the way that in the Catholic countries of Europe they may actively have discouraged their sons from breaching the Papal Index. However little either lonely predestinarian anxiety or hostility to Popish idolatry and superstition may have had to do with it, European Protestants 'who did most to proclaim God's sovereignty were also those most active in helping themselves' (Thomas, 1971: 112) . To that extent, Protestantism can be said to have not only permitted but encouraged a 'spirit' (i.e. a set of memes) for which there is much less evidence among either Chinese Confucian or European Catholic families -at least until, in the European case, the visible example of successful 'modern' Protestant entrepreneurs encouraged their Catholic counterparts to learn from them by a further process of Nachahmung and Auslese.
Notes
A preliminary version of this article was presented at a Social and Political Sciences seminar in Cambridge in February 1999. I am grateful to the members of the seminar, particularly Jack Goody and Bryan Turner, for their contributions to the discussion and to Gordon Marshall and Richard Swedberg for their comments on a subsequent draft. All translations from Weber's writings are my own.
1.
In a long footnote in 'Roscher und Knies und die logischen Probleme der historischen Nationalokonomie' (1951: 40 n. 1), where he attacks the derivation of a normative Weltanschauung from a historical Entwicklungsgedanke, he also ridicules naïve natural-scientific Evolutionisten for advising religion to come to terms with them.
2.
I have not attempted anything approaching a systematic review of the extensive secondary literature. For guidance to those parts of it that are of particular relevance to the theme of this article, I have looked to Swedberg (1998: Ch.5 ) and Hamilton (1996: Ch. 3) as well as to Lehmann and Roth (1987) and Marshall (1982) .
3.
